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Abstract
We study the e¤ects of preferential trade agreements (PTA) in a model where
the income matters for consumption patterns. We develop a three-country Ricardian
trade model in which goods are ranked according to priority and where economies dif-
fer in their income level. The poorest (richest) country has a comparative advantage
in the production of lowest-ranked (highest-ranked) goods, specializing in goods with
low (high) income elasticities in demand. The medium rich country specializes in
the production of the intermediate-ranked commodities. We nd that being excluded
from a PTA is detrimental for a low-income country, but not for the high-income
country. Becoming a member of a PTA does also not guarantee welfare gains for
the low income country, unless it is so poor that it cannot import the higher-ranked
goods that the rich country produces.
Keywords: Ricardian trade model; asymmetric demand complementarities; Cus-
toms Union; income distribution.
JEL classication: F1
We would like to thank Marcia Schafgans for her helpful comments and profound suggestions.
yNijmegen School of Management, Department of Economics, Radboud University Nijmegen, The
Netherlands. Email: a.devaal@fm.ru.nl.
zFaculty of Social Sciences, School of Economics, Kingston University, Kingston upon Thames, KT1
2EE.
1. Introduction
In May 2004, eight new countries from central Europe (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Czech Rep. Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia) have joined the European Union (EU), along
with the Mediterranean islands of Cyprus and Malta. These countries have a signicantly
lower per capita income and are also much more specialized in agriculture than the average
of the pre-accession EU-15 (see Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2003).1 This is just one example of
integration between countries that di¤er signicantly in their level of economic development.
Another example is, of course, the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta), which
includes the United States of America, Canada and Mexico.
As has been reported by World Trade Organization (WTO, 2002), this exemplies a
growing trend towards preferential trade agreements (PTAs) between countries of substan-
tially di¤erent income levels. The theoretical connection between the level of per capita
income and preferential trade has however not received adequate attention. In particular,
it has ignored the fact that countries with di¤erent levels of development may have quite
di¤erent priorities regarding which goods to consume. Whereas the standard literature
focuses on comparative advantage as the main di¤erence between countries, we argue that
in a world where income di¤erences between countries persist and widen, one cannot longer
ignore the impact of nonhomothetic preferences on trade patterns and welfare.2 Indeed,
the assumed similarity in consumption patterns is at odds with a number of stylized facts.
Firstly, many new, sophisticated products are developed in countries with high per capita
incomes, created by entrepreneurs in response to a perceived demand. Individuals in coun-
tries with lower per capita income tend to buy relatively simple products. Recent evidence
for this is provided by Schott (2001). 3 Secondly, new goods are originally developed and
1Even if the annual growth rate of these countries would exceed that of the rest of the EU by two per-
centage points, it will take them on average 50 years to catch up. (The Economist Intelligence Unit,Europe
Enlarged: Understanding the Impact.)
2There are of course good reasons for this gap in the literature. The rst wave of PTAs in the 1950s
was almost exclusively among countries with similar per capita income and e¤ective arrangements were
restricted to Western Europe. Assuming homothetic preferences is then a natural choice, which indeed
has been the case without exception (see Baldwin & Venables (1995), Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996a,
1996b), and Panagariya (2000) for an overview of the literature). The recent emergence of vast numbers of
new PTAs led economists and policy analysts to focus exclusively on the implications of such blocs for the
global trading system (see, for example, Levy (1997) and Krishna (1998). Finally, a complicating factor
has been that until recently the possibility of relaxing the homotheticity assumption on demand rendered
the analysis di¢ cult, if not intractable (see for example Wilson, 1980).
3See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), Hunter and Markusen (1987) and Hunter (1991).
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produced in developed countries and only at a later point in their cycle consumed in less
developed countries (Vernon, 1966). Thirdly, the volume of trade will be higher between
countries with similar per capita income (Linder, 1961).
The present paper develops a model for analyzing PTAs that assigns a central role to
income di¤erences and nonhomothetic preferences. The model builds on Matsuyama (2000)
who incorporates nonhomothetic preferences in a two country Ricardian trade model with
a continuum of goods. We extend his framework and apply it to the issue of preferen-
tial trade arrangements when countries di¤er with respect to income levels. Countries
are ranked such that the poorest country has a comparative advantage in the produc-
tion of the lower-ranked goods with low income elasticities in demand, the richest country
has a comparative advantage in the production of the highest-ranked goods with high in-
come elasticities in demand, and the medium rich country has a comparative advantage in
the production of intermediate-ranked commodities with intermediate income elasticities
of demand. Nonhomothetic preferences are incorporated by ordering goods according to
priority in consumption. Goods at the lower end of the spectrum are consumed by all
households. When real income increases households add higher-ranked goods to their con-
sumption basket, instead of buying more of the goods they already consume. As such, our
model also exhibits the property of asymmetric demand complementarities: as the price
of lower-ranked goods falls, due to lower tari¤s say, the resulting real income gain induces
households to expand their consumption baskets by adding goods of higher priority. If, by
contrast, the price of higher-ranked goods decline, the demand for low priority goods is
however una¤ected by the real income gain.
In our analysis we focus on the e¤ects of PTAs when there are substantial income di¤er-
ences between countries. The following insights emerge. First, a PTA does not necessarily
deteriorate the terms of trade of the country that is left outside of the agreement, though
this very much depends on the income level of the non-member. We show that while being
a non-member is typically bad for the terms of trade of a poor country, for a rich country
the terms of trade still improves. Second, being left outside of a PTA agreement is also typ-
ically bad for welfare, except for the rich country. This is due to the presence of asymmetric
demand complementarities. Whereas the outside country su¤ers as the PTA membersex-
penditure switching goes at their expense, for a rich country this might be compensated by
the fact that the real income gains are typically spent on country 3 goods. Third, being a
member of a PTA is no guarantee for welfare improvements. Only countries that are too
poor to import the whole range of world products can be assured that opening up their
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borders preferentially leads to welfare gains. For the other countries it depends to a large
extent on how comparative advantages di¤er across the world.4 Consequently, the income
level of a country greatly matters for assessing the welfare e¤ects of PTAs. Moreover, we
nd that it is not only the income di¤erences per se that matter, but also the extent of
these income di¤erences. While being a low income country leads to di¤erent inferences
regarding the costs and benets of preferential trading agreements than being a medium or
high income country, it also holds that these results depend highly on whether or not the
low-income country is partly insulated from world trade. In fact, our analysis shows that
the very poor countries have most to gain by joining a preferential trade agreement with a
rich counterpart.
Our paper is related to Appleyard, Conway and Field (1989) and the twin paper Conway,
Appleyard and Field (1989) in terms of focus (on preferential trade agreements) and the
modelling of the supply side (a Ricardian trade model with a continuum of goods). Our
model clearly di¤ers with respect to the demand side, however. In short, both construct
a similar model to ours but assume preferences to be Cobb-Douglas over a xed range of
goods. This implies that each household spends a constant expenditure share on each good
regardless of the level of income. Consequently, in their models income di¤erences  within
and across countries  do not matter for the aggregate variables, ruling out an adequate
analysis of PTAs between countries that di¤er in their stage of economic development.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we use Matsuyama (2000) and dis-
cuss how to extend his set-up to three countries plus the inclusion of initial tari¤s. Section
3 discusses some novel features of our model and focuses it on income di¤erences between
countries. Our analysis starts in Section 4 with the analyses of the general equilibrium and
welfare e¤ects of unilateral tari¤ reductions. In Section 5, we use these results to consider
the e¤ects of various formations of preferential trading arrangements in the wake of income
di¤erences between countries. Section 6 discusses the concomitant welfare e¤ects. Section
7 briey discusses multilateral tari¤ reductions and Section 8 concludes.
4Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996, Chapter 1) suggest that the formation of PTA among unequal partners
could be to the detriment of the less developed partner country. They do, however, not provide a formal
analysis for this claim.
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2. The Model
We consider three countries, countries 1, 2, and 3. In each of the countries we assume the
existence of a continuum of competitive industries, indexed by z 2 [0;1); each producing
a homogeneous good also indexed by z: There is one factor of production, labor, which is
supplied in xed quantity in country j (j = 1; 2; 3) and denoted by Lj. For good z, let aj(z)
be the unit labor requirement in country j (j = 1; 2; 3). We follow Appleyard, Conway and
Field (1989) (hereafter: ACF) and make the following assumptions on technology:
Assumption 1.
ai(z)
a1(z)
 Ai(z) with   z
Ai
@Ai
@z
  i > 0 for i = 2; 3 and all z:
Assumption 2. 2 < 3 for all z.
Assumption 1 is standard and requires that Ai (i = 2; 3) is smooth, continuous, and
strictly decreasing in z 2 [0;1):It ensures that commodities can be ranked in order of di-
minishing comparative advantage of country 1 relative to both country 2 and 3. Assumption
2 implies that A3(z) is relatively steeper than A2(z) so that A3(z)=A2(z) is strictly decreas-
ing in z. Assumption 2 ensures that country 3 has an increasing comparative advantage
relative to country 2 for higher z.
We start from a situation in which trade ows are distorted by tari¤s. Let  jk = 1+tjk be
one plus the ad valorem tari¤ in country j on any of the commodities z when it is produced
in country k (tjk > 0 for j 6= k and for all z). We assume that a country initially levies
uniform tari¤ rates on all imports regardless of the source, i.e.,  jk =  jk0 for j; k; k0 = 1; 2; 3
and k 6= k0. This assumption is not only for sake of analytical convenience but uniform
tari¤s on all imports are in keeping with the most favoured nation(MFN) clause of the
GATT Articles of Agreement. Assuming perfect competition, a country then exports good
z when it can produce that good at the lowest cost. Let the relative wages be !i = w1=wi
for i = 2; 3, the range of goods a country exports is dened by two inequalities. It follows
that there will be six equilibrium borderline goods zk for k = 1; ::6, which demarcate for
each country the range of own production, range of exports, and the range of nontraded
goods. These borderline goods are represented by equalities in (2.1)-(2.6) (see ACF (1989),
p.151).
Country 1 will export to country 2 i¤ :
 21w1a1 5 w2a2 and  21w1a1 5  23w3a3 implies  21!2 =
a2(z1)
a1(z1)
: (2.1)
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Country 1 will export to country 3 i¤
 31w1a1 5  32w2a2 and  31w1a1 5 w3a3 implies  31!2 =  32
a2(z2)
a1(z2)
: (2.2)
Country 2 will export to country 1 i¤
 12w2a2 5 w1a1 and  12w2a2 5  13w3a3 implies !2 =  12
a2(z3)
a1(z3)
: (2.3)
Country 2 will export to country 3 i¤
 32w2a2 5 w3a3 and  32w2a2 5  31w1a1 implies
!2
!3
=  32
a2(z4)
a3(z4)
: (2.4)
Country 3 will export to country 1 i¤
 13w3a3 5  12w2a2 and  13w3a3 5 w1a1 implies
!3
!2
=
a3(z5) 13
a2(z5) 12
: (2.5)
Country 3 will export to country 2 i¤
 23w3a3 5 w2a2 and  23w3a3 5  21w1a1 implies
!3
!2
=  23
a3(z6)
a2(z6)
: (2.6)
Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of the trade patterns in terms of the borderline
goods. Country 1 produces all z 2 [0; z3); of which [z2; z3] are not traded and [0; z1] and
[0; z2] are exported respectively to country 2 and 3. Country 2 produces all z 2 [z1; z6), of
which [z1; z2] and [z5; z6] are not traded and [z3; z5] and [z2; z4] are respectively exported
to country 1 and 3. Country 3, nally, produces all z 2 [z4; u3], of which [z4; z5] are not
traded, while [z5; u1] and [z6; u2] are respectively exported to country 1 and 2. Here uj
denotes the highest-indexed good z a household from country j, j = 1; 2; 3; consumes. The
resulting trade pattern z1 < z2 < z3 < z4 < z5 < z6 holds under the assumption that
directly importing good z costs less than importing the same good via a third country.5
More importantly, and in contrast to ACF, the trade patterns depicted only hold when
households in all three countries are rich enough to consume the higher indexed goods
country 3 produces. We will elaborate on this further below.
(insert Figure 1 about here)
5The exception is z3 < z4 where z4 < z3 is also possible. Moreover, even though we allow tari¤ rates to
di¤er between trading partners, these di¤erences should not be too signicant.
5
As country 1 exports all goods of the lower spectrum of commodities, country 3 the higher-
ranked commodities, and country 2 the middle-ranked goods, local prices are determined
by
pk(z) = min
j
[ kjwjaj(z)]:
Even if traded, the local price of good z does not need to be identical. The equilibrium
zk and uj are determined by the interaction of technology and demand, to which we now
turn.
On the demand side, we assume there are Nj households in country j. In line with
Matsuyama (2000) and Stibora & de Vaal (2006), we assume that the income distribution
is nondegenerate and brought about by tari¤ rebates and by di¤erences in skills reected in
di¤erences in e¤ective labor supply. We let Fj(hj) denote the distribution of e¤ective (skill
based) labor supply across households in country j. The total labor supply thus equals
Lj = Nj
R1
0
hjdFj(hj) in each country.
The consumption set of a household includes a continuum of z 2 [0;1). All house-
holds have the same preferences and maximize V =
R1
0
b(z)x(z)dz subject to the budget
constraint
R1
0
p(z)x(z)dz  I. In these expressions, x(z) = f0; 1g denotes the quantity
a household consumes and b(z) > 0 the utility it receives from consuming good z. Thus,
following Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), goods come in discrete units and a house-
holds desire to consume good z is satiated after the consumption of one unit. This has the
strong implication that, in contrast to standard analysis, an increase in utility is reected
in the consumption of an increased number of goods rather than in the consumption of
higher quantities of a xed number of goods. As such, wealthier households consume all
the goods consumed by poor households, plus some. Moreover, the linearity of the utility
function in b implies the absence of any substitution e¤ects and that only income e¤ects
are important for our results.
The order in which each household purchases goods is assumed to be the same as
the ordering of goods due to comparative advantage. Hence, we assume that households
consider lower-indexed goods to be of higher priority. These are purchased rst and when
income increases they add goods with lower priority to their consumption baskets. This
requires that the order of utility per unit price is strictly decreasing in z, that is, we assume
that
Assumption 3.
b(z)
pk(z)
=
b(z)
minj[ kjwjaj(z)]
is strictly decreasing in z, for given wj and  kj:
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The combination of assumptions 1, 2, and 3 implies that (i) country 1 has a comparative
advantage in the production of lower-ranked goods that poor households purchase: (ii)
country 3 has a comparative advantage in the production of higher-ranked goods that rich
households purchase; (iii) country 2 has a comparative advantage in the production of
intermediate-ranked goods that are purchased by households richer than those purchasing
goods from country 1 but poorer than those purchasing goods from country 3.
We now dene
Ej(z) 
Z z
0
pj(s)ds =
Z z
0
minf jkwkak(z)gds (2.7)
as the minimum level of income that allows a household from country j to consume good
z. As the consumption set will typically include imported goods, tari¤ revenues also a¤ect
the income distribution. We assume that the tari¤ revenue each household generates by
purchasing imported goods, if any, is collected by the government and redistributed across
households in a lump-sum fashion. Let us denote these tari¤ rebates in country j by TRj
and let us also assume that households take those rebates from the government as given.
The highest-indexed commodity a household in country j with skill level hj is able to
consume, uj(hj), is determined by the requirement that
Ej[uj(hj)] = wjhj + TRj (2.8)
for j = 1; 2; 3: The utility level a household in country j attains when consuming uj(hj)
is Vj(hj) = B(uj(hj)) where B(z) 
R z
0
b(s)ds: Vj(hj); the level of utility attained by
a household from country j, maps one-to-one into uj(hj); the highest-indexed good it
consumes. We therefore use the latter as a measure of utility (see Matsuyama (2000)).
Good z is purchased by households only if their income is not lower than Ej(z), or
equivalently if their skill is such that wjhj+TRj exceeds Ej(z). The fraction of households
with income (skills) in excess of Ej(z); or with wjhj > Ej(z)   TRj; is given by 1  
Fj([E(z)   TRj]=wj): Aggregate demand for good z consists of all those households from
all three countries whose income is equal or greater than Ej(z):
Qj(z) = Nj

1  Fj

E(z)  TRj
wj

for j = 1; 2; 3: (2.9)
In contrast to the standard literature, equation (2.9) indicates that total demand for good
z does not depend on the aggregate income but on the number of households that have a
su¢ cient level of income (skill) to consume it.
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In the presence of tari¤s, country 1 produces only goods in [0; z3), of which [0; z1] are
exported to country 2 and of which [0; z2] are exported to country 3. Consequently, labor
market equilibrium in country 1 has to satisfy:
L1 = N1
R1
0
h1dF1(h1)
=
R z3
0
a1(z)Q1(z)dz +
R z2
0
a1(z)Q3(z)dz +
R z1
0
a1(z)Q2(z)dz:
(2.10)
The left hand side of (2.10) represents country 1s e¤ective labor supply and the right hand
side is the derived demand for its labor. Combining (2.10) and (2.9), and using (2.7),
country 1s labor market equilibrium can be expressed as (see Appendix 9.1.1 for details)
w1L1 = N1
1R
0
min [w1h1 + TR1; E1(z3)] dF1(h1)
+
N2
 21
1R
0
min [w2h2 + TR2; E2(z1)] dF2(h2)
+
N3
 31
1R
0
min [w3h3 + TR3; E3(z2)] dF3(h3);
(2.11)
with E2(z1) =  21
R z1
0
w1a1(s)ds; E3(z2) =  31
R z2
0
w1a1(s)ds; and E1(z3) =
R z3
0
w1a1(s)ds.
Equation (2.11) denes national income for country 1, which has to be equal to the total
spending on goods produced in that country (including tari¤s). Total spending, in turn,
is the sum of country 1s expenditure on its own goods, N1min[w1h1 + TR1; E1(z3)] and
country j = 2; 30s expenditure on country 1 goods. We note that the country 1s tari¤
rebate as a result of imports from country 2, TR1; is only positive if the income of (some of
the) households in country 1 exceeds E1(z3), otherwise tari¤ revenues are zero. The tari¤
rebates for country 2 and country 3 (TR2 and TR3) are always positive, since households
from those countries always import the lower-indexed goods produced in country 1.
Similar reasoning applies to the labor market equilibrium condition for country 2 and 3,
which we derive in Appendix 9.1.1. As is typical in the literature of pure trade theory, the
three labor market equilibrium conditions are replaced by the equivalent statement that in
equilibrium trade has to be balanced (see Appendix). For the trade balance condition of
country 1, we obtain
N2
 21
1R
0
min[w2h2 + TR2; E2(z1)]dF2(h2) +
N3
 31
1R
0
min[w3h3 + TR3; E3(z2)]dF3(h3)
=
1R
0

N1
 12
min [w1h1 + TR1   E1(z3); E1(z5)  E1(z3)]
+
N1
 13
max [w1h1 + TR1   E1(z5); 0]

dF1(h1)
(2.12)
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and for country 2:
1R
0

N2
 21
min [w2h2 + TR2; E2(z1)] +
N2
 23
max [w2h2 + TR2   E2(z6); 0]

dF2(h2)
=
N1
 12
1R
0
min [w1h1 + TR1   E1(z3); E1(z5)  E1(z3)] dF1(h1)
+
N3
 32
1R
0
min [w3h3 + TR3   E3(z2); E3(z4)  E3(z2)] dF3(h3);
(2.13)
where E1(z5) E1(z3) =  12
R z5
z3
w2a2(s)ds and E3(z4) E3(z2) =  32
R z4
z2
w2a2(s)ds: Notice,
both (2.12) and (2.13) give a representation of the demand side only. The rst row in (2.12)
[(2.13)] represents the value of country 1s (2s) exports, which, in equilibrium, has to equal
its value of imports due to the static nature of the model.
The six equations that determine e¢ cient production, (2.1)-(2.6), together with the bal-
anced trade conditions (2.12)-(2.13) and the three budget conditions, given by (2.8), dene
a system of 11 equations which jointly determine the equilibrium values of the marginal
goods z1  z6, the relative wage rates !i ( w1=wi) for i = 2; 3, and the utility levels uj for
j = 1; 2; 3.
As is apparent from (2.12) and (2.13), the skill distribution of hj and the distribution of
TRj a¤ect the endogenous variables. This is a direct result of incorporating nonhomothetic
preferences. While the income of some households (in some countries) will be su¢ cient to
buy the highest-indexed good, for other households income may only su¢ ce to buy lower-
indexed goods. This a¤ects the precise form of the trade balance conditions as we show in
the next section.
3. Discussion of the model
Before we proceed we would like to highlight some novel aspects of the present model. This
is facilitated by making two further assumptions:6
Assumption 4. hj = 1, j = 1; 2; 3.
Assumption 5. a2(z)=a1(z) < 1 and a3(z)=a2(z) < 1 for all z 2 [0;1):
6Similar assumptions have been made by Flam and Helpman (1987) and Stokey (1991) in the context of
a simple North-South model of trade with nonhomothetic preferences. Additionally, those authors assume
that goods are ranked according to product quality and that goods are gross substitutes. However, they
do not analyze the formation of PTAs.
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Assumption 4 states that households in country j are homogenous.7 As such assumption
4 eliminates income di¤erences within countries but not across countries. Assumption 5
ensures that !2 < 1 < !2=!3. When combined with assumptions 1-3, it follows that country
1 (3) is the low-income (high-income) country, which specializes in lower-ranked (high-
ranked) goods with low (high) income elasticities in demand; and country 2 is the middle-
income country, which specializes in the intermediate range of goods with intermediate
income elasticities in demand.8
Given assumptions 1-3, the model always generates a unique equilibrium, but two equi-
librium congurations turn out to be of special interest. The rst equilibrium outcome
holds that all households spend their last unit of income on goods produced in country
3. The resulting trade pattern is characterized by two-way bilateral trade ows between
any pair of countries. We refer to this equilibrium conguration as the symmetric trade
equilibrium. The conditions for balanced trade become (see 9.2), in place of (2.12) and
(2.13):
N1(1 
Z z3
0
a1(s)ds) = N2
Z z1
0
a1(s)ds+N3
Z z2
0
a1(s)ds (3.1)
and
N2(1 
Z z6
z1
a2(s)ds) = N1
Z z5
z3
a2(s)ds+N3
Z z4
z2
a2(s)ds (3.2)
where the rst row in (3.1) [(3.2)] denotes the value of country 1s (country 2s) imports
and the second row the corresponding value of exports. The highest-indexed good, uj,
and thus the utility attained by a household in country j (j = 1; 2; 3) associated with the
symmetric trade equilibrium is derived from (2.8) and given byZ z3
0
a1(s)ds+
Z z5
z3
a2(s)
!2
ds+
Z u1
z5
a3(s)
!3
ds = 1 (3.3)
Z z1
0
a1(s)ds+
Z z6
z1
a2(s)
!2
ds+
Z u2
z6
a3(s)
!3
ds =
1
!2
(3.4)Z z2
0
a1(s)ds+
Z z4
z2
a2(s)
!2
ds+
Z u3
z4
a3(s)
!3
ds =
1
!3
: (3.5)
The absence of any tari¤ terms in (3.3)-(3.5) is due to the fact that households actually
pay a tari¤ exclusive price as a result of the proportional tari¤ rebates. The symmetric
7In a companion paper de Vaal & Stibora (2006b), we allow for nondegenerate income distributions
across countries.
8Violation of assumption 5 could imply that country 3 households become so poor that they are only
able to consume goods from countries 1 and 2. All the high-indexed goods country 3 produces are then
exported to the two richer countries. For obvious reasons, we do not pursue this parameter constellation.
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equilibrium satises z1 < ::: < z6 < u1 < u2 < u3, and corresponds to what is illustrated in
Figure 1.
The second equilibrium conguration we consider is when households from country 1
are not rich enough to consume goods produced in country 3. In this case households in
country 1 spend their last unit of income on goods produced in country 2, while households
in country 2 and 3 still spend their marginal income on goods produced in country 3, that
is, w1 + TR1   E1(z3) < E1(z5)   E1(z3): Consequently, country 1 runs a trade surplus
vis-à-vis country 3, country 2 has a bilateral trade surplus vis-à-vis country 1, and country
3 has a bilateral trade surplus vis-à-vis country 2. We will refer to this outcome as the
asymmetric trade equilibrium. The conditions for balanced trade become:
N1(1 
Z z3
0
a1(s)ds) = N2
Z z1
0
a1(s)ds+N3
Z z2
0
a1(s)ds (3.6)
and
N2(1 
Z z6
z1
a2(s)ds) = !2N1(1 
Z z3
0
a1(s)ds) +N3
Z z4
z2
a2(s)ds: (3.7)
As before, the left hand side of (3.6) [(3.7)] represents country 1s (country 2s) value of
import which equals country 1s (country 2s) value of exports, the right hand side. The
noteworthy di¤erence with the symmetric trade equilibrium is of course the inclusion of
!2 in (3.7), to which we will come back below. Since u1 < z5; the budget constraint of a
country 1 household changes intoZ z3
0
a1(s)ds+
Z u1
z3
a2(s)
!2
ds = 1; (3.8)
while the budget constraints for country 2 and 3 are still given by (3.4) and (3.5). Con-
sequently, the asymmetric equilibrium satises z1 < ::: < u1 < z5 < z6 < u2 < u3, thus
making z5 redundant in the analysis (and in Figure 1).
Many features of these two equilibrium congurations deserve emphasis. Let us con-
centrate on the most important two.
First, the fundamental di¤erence with the literature on the formation of preferential
trade agreements is that the assumed preferences in the present model imply that goods
are not gross substitutes. That is, if the price of lower indexed goods declines, consumers do
not substitute toward relatively cheaper goods but instead expand the consumption basket
toward higher-indexed goods, as a result of the higher purchasing power. The immediate
implication of this is visible in the balanced trade conditions of either equilibrium constel-
lation. With regard to the balanced trade conditions of the symmetric trade equilibrium
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(3.1) and (3.2), when all households are rich enough to consume some goods from country
3, small changes in !i for i = 2; 3, do not a¤ect the demand for goods produced in coun-
tries 1 and 2, and hence the demand for labor in those countries. Look, for example, at an
increase in !2; which, ceteris paribus, improves country 1s and country 3s relative factor
terms of trade with country 2. At initial trade ows, country 3s value of imports from
country 2 falls which matches the increase in country 1s imports from country 3 and the
fall country 2s imports from country 3. An analogue argument applies to small changes
in the other factor prices. However, if the income of some households of country 1 is not
su¢ cient to purchase goods from country 3, country 2s trade balance will depend explicitly
on !2:The intuition for this is as follows. Suppose that the relative factor price of country
1 with respect to country 2 declines (lower !2). This loss in purchasing power of country
1 households reduces directly their demand for country 2 goods and indirectly the demand
for country 2s labor. To keep country 2s labor market in equilibrium, country 2 either
has to increase the range of goods its exports to country 3 (higher z4) and to decrease its
imports from country 3 (higher z6) or a combination of both to clear its labor market.
Second, the distinction between symmetric and asymmetric trade patterns arises en-
dogenously in our model. The distinction itself is of course not new as several authors
have used it to facilitate their analysis, see, for instance, Meade (1955), Mundell (1964),
ACF, and Berglas (1979). The notable di¤erence is, therefore, that in our framework the
(a)symmetry in trade patterns is a general equilibrium outcome, rather than a structure
that is being imposed to facilitate the analysis. This novel aspect allows us to analyze the
consequences of trade policy on trade and welfare in a multiregional setting in the presence
of signicant income e¤ects in a tractable manner.
4. Unilateral Tari¤ Policy among Heterogeneous Countries
Let us now examine the e¤ects of unilateral tari¤ reductions in a three country setting. For
the purpose at hand we assume that assumptions 4 and 5 hold. We contrast our results
with those of ACF, whose analysis is the closest parallel to the present model.9 ACF
assume that all households have identical and homothetic preferences over a xed range of
commodities, which can be represented by Vj =
R 1
0
(z) ln ej(z)dz; with real expenditure
on good z denoted by ej(z) and constant expenditure shares (z) > 0; which are uniform
9As the ACF framework does not allow for asymmetric spending patterns, the comparison is only
relevant for the symmetric spending equilibrium.
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across all three countries, and
R 1
0
(z)dz = 1: This assumption implies that each household
spends the fraction (zi) =
R zi
0
(z)dz of income on a subset of goods regardless of the
level of income. The qualitative impact of tari¤ changes is summarized in Table 1, with
mathematics relegated to Appendix 9.3.
(insert Table 1a/b about here)
From Table 1a, it is immediately apparent that in the present model a unilateral change
of either country 1 or 2s tari¤ on imports from country 3 ( 13 and  23) does neither a¤ect
e¢ cient production of country 1 nor its relative wage ratio with country 2, !2. Consider,
for instance, the reduction in country 2s tari¤ on exports from country 3 (d 23 < 0). This
lowers the price of those goods in country 2. At initial factor prices, country 2 loses some
industries to country 3 that were in direct competition (z6 falls). Since this competition
e¤ect also reduces country 2s range of nontraded goods, real income gains accrue for
households from country 2 in terms of those goods only, to which they respond by adding
higher-indexed goods produced in country 3 to their consumption basket, that is du2 > 0.
The real income in terms of previously traded goods remains unchanged because the gain
from lower prices is exactly compensated by the reduction in tari¤ rebate. Due to the
absence of substitution e¤ects, demand for country 1s produce is una¤ected and thus no
change in !2 is required. The ensuing trade decit for country 2 requires a deterioration in
country 2s terms of trade with respect to country 3 (higher !2=!3) to restore equilibrium,
implying a deterioration in country 1s terms of trade with respect to country 3 (lower !3).
These results are in sharp contrast to the ones derived by ACF that are given in the lower
panel of Table 1a for comparison. Considering the same reduction in  23, country 3s terms
of trade with respect to country 2 and 1 improve (higher !2=!3 and lower !3). In contrast
to our model, however, country 1s terms of trade vis-à-vis country 2 changes too (higher
!2) as a consequence of substitution e¤ects. Lower prices of country 3s goods in country
2 induces households to substitute away from the relatively more expensive domestic and
country 1 goods. Because of this substitution e¤ect, the bilateral trade balance of country
3 with 2 moves into surplus and the bilateral trade balance of country 1 with 2 into decit.
Next to these direct demand side e¤ects on the trade balances comes the supply side e¤ect
of the lower  23 on e¢ cient production. At initial prices the reduction of  23 allows country
2 to import goods that previously were nontraded (z6 falls), thereby widening the trade
decit (surplus) for country 2 (3). The reduction in the range of nontraded goods increases
the real income of households from country 2, increasing the demand for all goods, while
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the reduction in tari¤ rebate reduces the demand for all goods. Assuming that goods
are gross substitutes implies that the substitution e¤ect dominates the income e¤ect. To
restore equilibrium this necessitates a deterioration in country 2s terms of trade relative to
country 3 (higher !2=!3): This also reduces country 1s imports from country 3, requiring
an increase in !2.
The di¤erence in the demand structure has important implications for the analysis to
follow. Comparing our results in Table 1a with those of ACF shows that our results are
often determined by (i) the degree of comparative advantage a country has at a particular
borderline good zk - represented by the parameters 2 > 0 and  > 0; and (ii) the size of
real income changes, which are decisively determined by the population size.
Consider, for example, a reduction in country 1s tari¤ on imports from country 2,
that is, d 12 < 0; ceteris paribus. At initial relative wages, a fall in  12 reduces the price
of country 2 goods in country 1, and its range of imports from country 2 increases at
the expense of (some) domestic rms (lower z3) and of some rms from country 3 that
directly compete with country 2 rms on country 1s market (higher z5). Note that these
competition e¤ects do not correspond with the real income e¤ects since only the reduction in
z3 increases the real income of country 1shouseholds. In the symmetric trade equilibrium,
these real income gains are spent exclusively on country 3s goods, that is du1 > 0.10 The
direct impact of lower  12 for country 1 is a trade decit. To restore equilibrium country
1s factor terms of trade have to improve unambiguously (lower !2). The e¤ect of lower
 12 on the trade balance of country 3, on the other hand, is ambiguous and depends on 2
and : Note, both 2 and  can be any positive number. Suppose that 2 is small, for a
given positive value of   3 2. The smaller is 2; the weaker is country 1s comparative
advantage in comparison to country 2 at z3; the larger is the loss of industries to country 2,
and the larger the concomitant real income gains experienced by households from country
1. Due to the asymmetry of demand complementarities these real income gains become
e¤ective in country 3 only, generating a trade surplus. To restore equilibrium country 3s
relative factor terms of trade have to improve (higher !2=!3). Suppose now that 2 is
given, and that  is small but positive. This, in turn, implies that country 2s comparative
advantage vis-à-vis country 3 is strong at z5: lower  12 causes a considerably increase in
the range of goods taken over by country 2 at the expense of country 3. In this case, the
10As shown in the appendix, the change in du1 for given relative wages is a¤ected by both the change
in z3 and z5: Assuming that country 1 imposes the same tari¤ on imports from country 2 and 3 in the
original equilibrium, that is 12 = 13; the later e¤ect cancels.
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expansion of country 1s householdsrange of consumption toward country 3 goods due to
the real income e¤ect is smaller in comparison to the loss in the range of goods country 3
exports to country 1. At initial factor prices, therefore, country 3s balance of trade turns
into a decit. To restore equilibrium, country 3s factor terms of trade have to deteriorate
(lower !2=!3): Since the real income e¤ect and the competition e¤ect have opposing e¤ects
on the trade balance of country 3 and thereby indirectly the demand for labor the values of
2 and  are crucial in the present model to determine the signs of endogenous variables.
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Some of the ambiguity is resolved when considering the asymmetric trade equilibrium.
Recall that this equilibrium conguration implies that country 1 spends its last unit of
income on goods produced in country 2 instead of country 3. Consequently, the real income
gain due to, for example, lower  12 becomes e¤ective in country 2 and country 3s trade
balance turns unambiguously into a decit, at initial factor prices (see Table 1b).
To see the importance of the size of real income changes and thus the size of the
population on the endogenous variables, let us consider the discriminate tari¤ reduction
d 31 < 0; ceteris paribus. This reduces the price of country 1s imports in country 3. Firms
from country 1 competing with rms from country 2 gain in competitiveness and exports
to country 3 increase. At initial factor prices, country 1 experiences a trade surplus that
is exactly matched by an equivalent decit for country 2. Country 1s terms of trade vis-
a-vis country 2 has to improve (higher !2) to restore equilibrium. This indirectly reduces
z2:The direct e¤ect overcomes the indirect e¤ect and z2 increases. Recall that the change
in !2 has no direct e¤ect on country 3s initial trade balance. However, the change in
!2 a¤ects all other borderline goods in addition to z2: In particular, country 1s range
of domestic production falls (lower z3) and previously nontraded goods are now imported
from country 2. Thus, country 1s real income increases and its imports from country
3 increase by N1a2(z3)z3( 12   1). On the other hand, country 2s range of production
increases at the lower end (lower z1) and households replace goods previously imported
from country 1 with domestic goods that are now nontraded. As a result, country 2s real
income falls and so are its imports from country 3 to the extent of N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1).
Assuming that N1a2(z3)z3( 12   1) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1), country 3s trade balance turns
into a surplus. The fall in  31 leads to a higher !2 which in turn a¤ects also the upper
range of the borderline goods zk for k = 4; 5; 6. From the point of view of country 3,
11Another implication of our set-up is that also redistribution policies within a country and/or a customs
union a¤ect aggregate variables, as is apparent from (2.12) and (2.13). We have elaborated extensively on
the consequences of this in Stibora and de Vaal (2006).
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imports from country 2 increase (higher z4), while exports to countries 2 and 1 decrease
(higher z5 and z6). With imports increasing on net, country 3s trade balance turns into
a decit. The improvement of !2 for given !3 has an ambiguous e¤ect on country 3s
trade balance and hence on the required change in !3: For given positive , and letting
N1a2(z3)z3( 12 1) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21 1); if 2 is small the real income e¤ect dominates the
competition e¤ect and country 3s trade balance turns into a surplus. As a consequence,
!3 has to fall for country 3s relative wage ratio with country 2 to improve (higher !2=!3).
On the other hand, for 2 positive and  small, the real income e¤ect is negligible and the
increase in imports dominate. Country 3s trade balance turns into a decit and its terms
of trade with country 1 have to deteriorate (higher !3) relative to the higher !2 to reduce
the increase in country 3s imports.12
In the asymmetric trade equilibrium, the net outcome of the real income e¤ect of changes
in !2 on country 3s trade balance is absent for reasons given above. The same fall in
 31 that improves country 1s relative wage ratio with country 2, ceteris paribus, increases
country 1s imports from country 2 but reduces country 2s imports from country 3, thereby
generating a trade decit for country 3. To restore equilibrium country 3s relative wage
ratio with country 2 has to deteriorate (lower !2=!3) implying that country 1s relative
wage ratio with country 3 to improve (higher !3). The change in the relative factor price
a¤ects indirectly all other borderline goods zk, as illustrated in Table 1b.
In contrast to the standard literature on the formation of preferential trade agreements
and in particular to ACF the range of industries producing in the world economy is not xed.
This additional aspect of our framework can best be seen by examining the e¤ect of tari¤
changes on the highest indexed good consumed uj, and hence on the change in utility. This
is accomplished by di¤erentiation of the budget constraints (3.3)-(3.5), assuming  jk =  jk0
for j; k; k0 = 1; 2; 3, for given productivity parameters (see Appendix 9.4 for details). For
the symmetric trade equilibrium this yields for country 1
a3(u1)du1 =
!3
!2
R z5
z3
a2(s)dsb!2 + R u1z5 a3(s)dsb!3 + !3!2a2(z3)z3(1   12)bz3 (4.1)
12Note, in case that the real income change of country 2 is larger in comparison to country 1, that
is, N1a2(z3)z3(12   1) < N2a1(z1)z1(21   1); country 3s trade balance turns into a decit, regardless
of the values for  and 2: We exclude this possibility and assume for the remainder of the paper that
N1 > N2 > N3; ensuring that country 1 is the poorest country while country 3 the richest.
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for country 2
a3(u2)du2 =  !3!2
h
1  R z6
z1
a2(s)ds
i b!2 + R u2z6 a3(s)dsb!3
+!3a1(z1)z1( 21   1)bz1   a3(z6)z6( 23   1)bz6 (4.2)
and for country 3
a3(u3)du3 =
!3
!2
Z z4
z2
a2(s)dsb!2   1  Z u3
z4
a3(s)ds
 b!3 + ( 32   1)!3
!2
a2(z4)z4bz4: (4.3)
For the asymmetric equilibrium, the expressions for country 2 and country 3 are the same.
The expression for country 1 becomes, instead of (4.1):
a2(u1)du1 =
Z u1
z3
a2(s)dsb!2   ( 12   1)a2(z3)z3bz3: (4.4)
The hatnotation is used to express relative changes, e.g. b is dened as d= : The rst
term(s) on the right hand side in (4.1)-(4.3) and (4.4) represent the factor terms of trade
e¤ect(s) weighted by the countrys value of imports. The second terms reect the impact
on real income via changes in the range of nontraded goods. This latter term can also be
interpreted as the change in deadweight loss caused by the change in the import volume
as a result of the change in the range of nontraded goods. Since we started from a tari¤-
ridden equilibrium there is also a price e¤ect of lower tari¤s on the tari¤ revenues, holding
quantity constant. This price e¤ect drops out since, with homogeneous population, the
gains of lower prices of imported goods is exactly matched by lower tari¤ rebates. The
absence of !3 in (4.4) in comparison to (4.1) follows from the fact that country 1 does
only export but not import goods from country 3 in the asymmetric trade equilibrium.
The welfare e¤ects of unilateral tari¤ changes are presented in Tables 2a and 2b for the
symmetric and asymmetric case, respectively.
Table 2a for the symmetric case indicates that the poorest country, country 1, is in
general worse o¤from unilateral tari¤changes the more uniform are unit labor requirements
in industries across country 1 and country 2 (small 2) and the larger is : In this case the
deterioration in country 1s relative wage with country 3 dominates all other e¤ects. As a
consequence, households from country 1 experience signicant real income losses inducing
them to reduce their range of consumption, du1 < 0: The exceptions are the fall in  21 and
 32. Under the same conditions, country 3 in general gains from unilateral tari¤ changes.
From (4.3), du3 > 0: households from country 3 expand their consumption basket and their
welfare goes up. The real income gains of those households is an incentive for entrepreneurs
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to invent new products. We note therefore, that because of di¤erences in income elasticities,
the present model can explain the emergence of new industries in the world economy as
well as the emergence of product life cycles as discussed by Vernon (1966).
5. Formation of Preferential Trade Agreements between Hetero-
geneous Countries
We now proceed with investigating the e¤ects of the formation of preferential trade agree-
ments (PTAs) on global specialization and terms of trade. Before we discuss our main
ndings, it is useful to point out that establishing the e¤ects of PTAs essentially boils
down to adding the general equilibrium e¤ects of the relevant unilateral tari¤ reductions
that were discussed in the previous section.13 The reasoning we will employ therefore con-
sists of the same two main e¤ects as before. The rst e¤ect is that when tari¤s come down
the competitiveness of countries is a¤ected, and thereby the derived demand for labour.
The second e¤ect is that the formation of PTAs also a¤ects the ranges of nontraded goods,
real income e¤ects accrue, a¤ecting spending on goods from either country 3 (as in the
symmetric trade equilibrium) or from country 2 and country 3 (as in the asymmetric trade
equilibrium). Both e¤ects have consequences for the relative wages in the three coun-
tries, leading to the general equilibrium e¤ects discussed below. As we will see, however,
it typically su¢ ces to apply our simple two-step reasoning to explain the e¤ect of PTA
formation
PTA between countries 2 and 3 (PTA23).
Consider rst the formation of a PTA between the high-income country 3 and the
middle-income country 2, a situation which would resemble the recent enlargement of the
EU to the east. This implies a reduction of the bilateral tari¤s  23 and  32, while leaving
all other tari¤s at their initial value. Consequently, at initial factor prices, the member
countries will expand their imports from each other, that is z2  z4 increases while z6 falls:bz2b 32 = 12 > 0; bz4b 32 =  1 < 0; bz6b 23 = 1 > 0;
These competition e¤ects are the same regardless the type of equilibrium we consider
13A detailed appendix containing all the derivates is available in an appendix upon request from the
authors.
18
(symmetric, asymmetric)14 and are the result of the change in competitiveness of country
2 and country 3 producers on each others markets. As before, the extent to which the
tari¤ changes a¤ect competitiveness depends on the degree of comparative advantage at
the specic borderline commodity, as indicated by  and 2. The initial competition e¤ects
inuence the labor market of countries and adjustments in the bilateral terms of trade of
countries are required to restore equilibrium. The general equilibrium e¤ects of PTA23 are
given in Table 3. We note that the results are typically the same for both equilibrium
settings, except for some slight but telling changes in conditions.
(insert Table 3 about here)
The e¤ects on z1; z2; z3 and !2 are unambiguous, which is of course related to the fact that
the e¤ect of a fall in  23 on these variables is zero. In determining the signs for the other
variables we see that  and 2 play a key role. We therefore discuss the table by considering
the e¤ects when  is small (for 2 > 0), to then verify the results if instead 2 is small (for
given  > 0).
Suppose then that 2 > 0 and that  is small, that is unit labor requirements between
countries 2 and 3 are very similar. This implies that the initial competition e¤ects are
dominated by the upward e¤ect on z4 and the downward e¤ect on z6 (of course the e¤ect
on z2 is still there and indeed nicely explains the negative impact on !2). The upward
e¤ect on z4 increases the derived demand for country 2s labour and lowers it for country
3s labour, while the downward e¤ect on z6 does exactly the opposite. Consequently, the
net competition e¤ect on !2=!3 depends on each countrys marginal expenditure rate: if
N3a2(z4)z4 > N2a2(z6)z6 the e¤ect on z6 dominates and !2=!3 increases, deteriorating
country 2s factor terms of trade vis-à-vis country 3. The real income e¤ects that accrue
are positive, as both country 2 and country 3 may welcome a decline in their non-traded
goods ranges. These real income gains are spent on country 3 goods for both equilibrium
settings, which increases demand for country 3 labour, yielding additional upward pressure
on country 3s relative wage.
Suppose now that the unit labor requirements between country 1 and country 2 are
ceteris paribus more equalized, that is 2 is small for given  > 0. In this case, the
competitive e¤ect on z2 dominates the initial e¤ects. As z2 comes down, the derived
14By concentrating on marginal tari¤ changes in contrast to complete discrimination our results shed
light on the initial e¤ects of PTAs.
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demand of country 3 households for country 2s labour increases at the expense of demand
for country 1s labour. This explains the negative signs for !2 and !3. As both e¤ects
are related to country 3 households, the relative size of country 2 and country 3 does not
play a role. Rather it is the relative size of country 1 and country 2 that matters. The
decline in z2 lowers the non-traded goods range for country 2, but increases it for country
1. In the symmetric trade equilibrium, both countries spend their marginal income on
goods from country 3, explaining why the general equilibrium e¤ect on !2=!3 depends on
the relative size of country 1 and country 2: the bigger (smaller) country 1 is, the bigger
(smaller) the reduction in spending on country 3 goods, yielding a negative (positive) e¤ect
on the bilateral factor terms of trade of country 3 vis-à-vis country 2, i.e. !2=!3 goes down
(up). By contrast, in the asymmetric trade equilibrium, the negative real income e¤ect
in country 1 leads to less spending on country 2 goods, whereas the positive real income
e¤ect in country 2 still accrues to country 3 goods. This explains why in the asymmetric
equilibrium conguration the relative size of country 1 and country 2 does not matter when
2 ! 0. Moreover, the spending e¤ects give rise to an upward pressure on the bilateral
factor terms of trade of country 3 vis-à-vis country 2, explaining why !2=!3 is positive.
PTA between countries 1 and 2 (PTA12)
Consider next the formation of a PTA between the low-income country 1 and the
middle-income country 2. This implies a reduction of the bilateral tari¤s  12 and  21,
ceteris paribus. The general equilibrium e¤ects of PTA12 are presented in Table 4 and can
be explained by focusing on the initial competition and real income e¤ects.
The initial competition e¤ects on z1, z3 and z5, while keeping relative wages constant,
are bz1b 21 =   12 < 0; bz3b 12 = 12 > 0; bz5b 12 =  1 < 0;
where we note that the e¤ect on z5 only arises in the symmetric equilibrium conguration.
The changes in competitiveness yield both countries better access to each others markets,
the extent of which is determined by the indicator of comparative advantage at both mar-
ginal goods, 2. In the symmetric trade equilibrium, the improved access to each others
markets goes at the expense of the country that remains outside the agreement. For this
e¤ect  is the important parameter.
If  ! 0; the upward e¤ect on z5 dominates the e¤ects for the symmetric trade equilib-
rium. It increases demand for country 2 labour and decreases that for country 3 labour. The
real income e¤ects accrue because of changes in non-traded goods areas. In this case, the
non-traded goods range of country 2 decreases while that of country 3 increases. As both
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countries spend their marginal income on country 3 goods, the net e¤ect will typically be
negligible compared to the competition e¤ect, explaining the negative general equilibrium
e¤ect on !2=!3 and the fact that it is independent on the relative size of countries.15
If 2 ! 0, the competitive e¤ect on z1 and z3 dominates the initial e¤ects. As z1 goes
up, the derived demand of country 2 households for country 1s labour increases at the
expense of demand for its own labour force. Likewise, as z3 goes down, the derived demand
of country 1 households for country 2 labour increases at the expense of their labour. This
explains the negative sign for !2 and why it depends on the relative size of country 1 with
respect to country 2, also when 2 > 0. The income e¤ects are as follows. The increase of
z1 reduces the non-traded goods range for country 2, just like the decrease in z3 reduces
it for country 1. In the symmetric trade equilibrium both countries spend their marginal
income on country 3 goods, explaining the increase of the bilateral factor terms of trade of
country 3 vis-à-vis country 1 (!3 down). Taking the competition e¤ects and the spending
e¤ects together implies that !2=!3 goes up for 2 ! 0. In the asymmetric equilibrium
setting, the spending e¤ects of country 1 accrue instead to country 2 goods. This has no
e¤ect on the sign for !3, though the magnitude of its positive e¤ect will be less than before
as only the spending e¤ect of country 2 remains. Consequently, also the sign for !2=!3
remains clear.
(insert Table 4 about here)
PTA between countries 1 and 3 (PTA13)
Consider nally the formation of a PTA between the low-income country 1 and the
high-income country 3. As an examples might serve the preferential trade arrangements
the EU has with the ACP countries under the Lome convention. This implies, ceteris
paribus, a reduction of the bilateral tari¤s  13 and  31, leading to an increase in trade
between member countries due to the increase in z2 and fall in z5 at initial factor prices:
bz2b 31 =   12 < 0; bz5b 13 = 1 > 0;
15Of course, we realise that the simple reasoning we continuously apply can never give the exact story
behind the results. In a way, this is proven by the unclear sign that arises in the asymmetric case. The
question mark appears because we can derive that when  equals zero, the general equilibrium e¤ect on
!2=!3 is zero as well. If  approaches zero, however, we are not sure from which side !2=!3 appraches
zero. The complex condition we could derive for that in fact includes relative sizes of countries.
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where the impact on z5 again only holds for the symmetric trade equilibrium. The general
equilibrium e¤ects of PTA13 are presented in Table 5. We note that the e¤ects are to a
large extent opposite to that of PTA23 and that the asymmetric trade equilibrium involves
no ambiguities. The latter is due to the fact that country 1 does not import from country
3 in the asymmetric trade equilibrium. For both types of equilibria, the competition e¤ects
imply that trade between the two member countries expands. Since both countries are non-
contiguous, this trade expansion goes completely at the expense of country 2. If  ! 0; the
downward e¤ect on z5 dominates the e¤ects (the positive e¤ect on z2 again nicely serves to
explain the positive impact on !2). It decreases demand for country 2 labour and increases
demand for country 3 labour. The e¤ect is that !2=!3 should go up. For the real income
e¤ects it is important that in this case the non-traded goods range of country 2 increases
and that of country 3 decreases. As households in both countries spend their marginal
income in country 3, the net e¤ect will typically be negligible compared to the competition
e¤ect, explaining the general equilibrium e¤ect on !2=!3 and the fact that it is independent
of the relative size of countries. If 2 ! 0, the competitive e¤ect on z2 dominates the initial
competition e¤ects. As it increases, the derived demand of country 3 households for country
2 labour decreases in favour of demand for country 1 labour. This explains the positive
signs for !2 and !3. The increase of z2 increases the non-traded goods range for country
2, but lowers it for country 1. In the symmetric trade equilibrium both countries spend
their marginal income on country 3 goods, explaining why the general equilibrium e¤ect on
!2=!3 depends on the relative size of country 1 and country 2. The bigger (smaller) country
2, the bigger (smaller) the reduction in spending on country 3 goods, yielding a negative
(positive) e¤ect on the bilateral factor terms of trade of country 3 vis-à-vis country 2, i.e.
!2=!3 down (up). By contrast, in the asymmetric equilibrium setting the income e¤ect
in country 1 leads to increased spending on country 2 goods, whereas the income e¤ect in
country 2 still reduces spending on country 3 goods. This explains that in the asymmetric
trade equilibrium the relative size of country 1 and country 2 does not matter anymore
when 2 ! 0. Moreover, the spending e¤ects give rise to a further downward pressure on
the bilateral factor terms of trade of country 3 with respect to country 2, explaining that
!2=!3 is negative.
(insert Table 5 about here)
Having established the general equilibrium e¤ects for the alternative PTA arrangements,
a rst general insight that appears is that the formation of a PTA a¤ects factor prices and
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e¢ cient production by and large similarly for both the symmetric trade equilibrium and
the asymmetric trade equilibrium. Except for some telling di¤erences in conditions, the
signs we obtain are typically invariant to the equilibrium conguration under considera-
tion. The implication is of course that at this stage we therefore cannot say anything on
the quantitative impact of having big income di¤erences in the world or not. Numerical
simulations might shed further light on this matter, which we reserve for future work.
A second insight that emerges, is that a PTA does not necessarily deteriorate the terms
of trade of the country that is left outside the agreement.16 Here the income level of the non-
member is crucial, however. Leaving the specic conditions aside, it appears that whereas
a poor country can be pretty sure to see both of its bilateral factor terms of trade decline,
for a rich country there is fair chance that it sees its bilateral terms of trade improve. The
medium-income country is somewhere in between. Of course, this is directly related to the
asymmetric demand complementarities that are present in our framework. These ensure
that the positive real income e¤ects that result from switching from non-traded goods to
traded goods typically accrue to increased demand for country 3s labour.
A third and nal insight is that in establishing the general equilibrium e¤ects of PTAs
it is important to know the extent of the di¤erence in comparative advantages between
countries. It matters a great deal for the results whether there are similar comparative
advantages between the medium-income and high-income country, that is: when  is low,
or when there are similar comparative advantages between the low-income and medium-
income country, as is the case when 2 is low. In fact, these di¤erences are key to under-
standing the bilateral terms of trade e¤ects between the high-income country and either the
medium-income or the low-income country (!2=!3 and !3). It has no bearing on the e¤ect
of PTAs on the bilateral terms of trade of the low-income and medium-income country
(!2).
6. Welfare e¤ects of PTA formation
In the previous section we have looked at the resource allocation and terms of trade e¤ects
of economic integration when countries di¤er signicantly in their level of income. One of
the main outcomes has been that the formation of a PTA a¤ects factor prices and e¢ cient
productions by and large similarly, regardless of whether we considered the symmetric
16In this regard it is interesting to mention the empirical analysis of Winters and Chang (2000), who
nd that PTAs can signicantly diminish the terms of trade for nonparticipating countries.
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trade equilibrium or the asymmetric trade equilibrium. It thus seems that the global
income distribution does not qualitatively matter for results. In this section we will show
that it does when we consider the welfare implications of PTAs. The welfare e¤ects of PTA
formation crucially depend on the stage of economic development of the partner countries.
To derive the welfare implications of PTAs, we recall the expressions for duj (j = 1; 2; 3)
that were given when we discussed the welfare e¤ects of unilateral tari¤ reductions. As
stated there, the main di¤erence between (4.1) and (4.4) is the absence of b!3 from the latter
equation, since country 1 does not import with country 3 in the asymmetric equilibrium.
Moreover, we recall that the welfare e¤ects relates to changes in a countrys terms of trade
and to changes in trade volumes. The welfare e¤ects are presented in Table 6.
(insert Table 6 about here)
We rst consider the case where the poor country is not part of a PTA, that is PTA23.
When country 1 is too poor to import from country 3, as in the asymmetric trade equilib-
rium, welfare of households from country 1 deteriorates on account of the increase in the
range of goods produced locally (z3 increases) and on account of the deterioration of its
terms of trade with country 2 (!2 falls). As country 1s terms of trade with country 3 tends
to deteriorate  !3 goes down for low enough 2  du1 < 0 and welfare falls. This result
also holds when country 1 is rich enough to import from country 3, be it under similar
conditions as were needed to resolve the ambiguities in the e¤ect on !3.
On the other hand, the poorest country is likely to gain when forming a PTA itself.
In case country 1 is so poor that it does not import from country 3, a PTA with either
country 2 or country 3 is benecial as long as 2 is su¢ ciently small. A union with country
3 is to the benet of country 1, and depends only on the degree of comparative advantage,
that is: du1 > 0 if 2 is su¢ ciently small. When  is small this also holds for PTA13:The
welfare e¤ect for PTA12 is then unclear, which is related to the positive e¤ect on !3 when
 is low. We note that when country 1 can a¤ord imports from country 3, the welfare
e¤ects are typically reversed or ambiguous. Clearly, it pays o¤ to be poor when engaging
in preferential trade!
What can we say about the welfare e¤ects for the other two countries? We infer from
the table that PTA23 gives the clearest results on the welfare of country 2 and country 3.
An agreement between the medium rich and the rich country is welfare improving for both
country 2 and 3 if  is small (this holds for both equilibrium settings). Being contiguous,
a low  implies that the range of non-traded goods in both countries reduces considerably
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and large real income gains result, du2 > 0, du3 > 0. When 2 is low, the importance of
where country 1 households spend their marginal income is important for understanding
the welfare e¤ects. If the real income losses in country 1 imply reduced spending on country
3 goods (symmetric trade equilibrium), country 3 loses; if they imply reduced spending on
country 2 goods (asymmetric trade equilibrium), country 2 loses. With respect to the
e¤ects of the other two PTAs the noteworthy result is that when country 1 is too poor to
import from country 3, the preferred strategy for country 3 is not to engage in a PTA with
country 1, but to encourage a PTA12. The absence of a positive spending e¤ect of country 1
consumers on country 3 goods once again explains why this is the case. A similar reasoning
holds of course for country 2. When country 1 households are rich enough to a¤ord country
3 goods, some of these results reverse, emphasizing the importance of income di¤erences
on understanding the welfare e¤ects of PTAs.
This leads to the following general insights. First, being a member of a PTA is no
guarantee for welfare improvements. The only exception seems to be when a country is too
poor to a¤ord the whole range of products the world has to o¤er. Else the welfare e¤ects
of being a member or not depend on the extent to which comparative advantages di¤er,
both between the member countries and with respect to non-member countries. Secondly,
it appears that being left outside of a PTA agreement does not necessarily lead to welfare
losses. The odds are now against the poorer countries, however. The more one produces at
the higher end of the goods spectrum (here country 3), the more likely it is that being left
outside is not detrimental for welfare. This is due to the presence of asymmetric demand
complementarities. Whereas the outside country su¤ers as the PTA membersexpenditure
switching goes at the expense of the outside country, the ensuing real income gains of the
members may compensate for this. Third, it appears that not only the income di¤erences
per se matter for the welfare results of PTAs, but also the extent of these income di¤erences
matter. While being a low income country leads to di¤erent inferences regarding the costs
and benets of preferential trading agreements than being a medium or high income country,
it also holds that these results depend highly on whether or not the low-income country is
partly insulated from world trade. Consequently, income di¤erences between countries are
of crucial importance to gauge the welfare e¤ects of preferential trade liberalization.
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7. Multilateral Tari¤Reductions
Countries also participate in multilateral trade negotiations. The general equilibrium e¤ects
are given in Table 7a. At initial relative wages, this yields the following impact e¤ect on
competitivenessbz1b =   12 < 0; bz2b = 0; bz3b = 12 > 0; bz4b =  1 < 0; bz5b = 0; bz6b = 1 > 0;
for ^ ij = ^ < 0 for i; j = 1; 2; 3 and i 6= j: Reducing tari¤ rates proportionally across
all nations of course only a¤ects the borderline commodities that delineate non-traded
goods and traded goods. Accordingly, labour demand for country 1s labor force declines
because its highest-ranked goods are lost to country 2, while at the same time it increases
because country 2 loses some of its lower-ranked goods to country 1. Likewise labour
demand e¤ects arise for country 2 and 3. The e¤ect of these competition e¤ects on the
bilateral factor terms of trade of each country is of course related to the strength of their
respective comparative advantages at the borderline commodities 2 and . As all countries
see their ranges of non-traded goods decline, the initial real income e¤ects work in favor of
country 3s labor (symmetric trade equilibrium) or in favour of both country 2s and country
3s labor (asymmetric trade equilibrium). This implies that if 2 ! 0, so that country
3s competitiveness is initially una¤ected, country 3s bilateral factor terms of trade will
improve across the board for both equilibrium settings. The e¤ect on !2 logically depends
on the relative size of country 1 and country 2, as the condition indicates. If  ! 0, it is
country 1 that is initially shielded from the competition e¤ects. The initial impact on z4
and z6 dominate e¤ects, and consequently the relative sizes of country 2 and 3 are important
for !2=!3. Absent initial e¤ect, the impact on country 1s termss of trade still depends
on its relative size with respect to country 2. The concomitant welfare e¤ects are given
in Table 7b. When the income di¤erences between countries are not too big (symmetric
trade equilibrium) , it appears that the rich country is most likely to gain from multilateral
trade liberalization, while the poor country stands a fair chance to lose. When the poor
countrys income is so low that it cannot a¤ord country 3 goods, also country 1 will gain.
8. Conclusion
This paper examines the e¤ects of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on resource alloca-
tion and welfare when countries di¤er in their stage of economic development. Traditionally,
international economists make the simplifying assumption of homothetic preferences when
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analyzing the formation of preferential trade agreements. The homotheticity assumption
implies that all goods have the same unitary income elasticities and that poor and rich
households alike consume all available goods in the same proportion. However, in light
of a growing trend towards regional integration agreements between countries of substan-
tially di¤erent income levels, assuming homothetic preferences may be too far-fetched. We
therefore develop a three-country Ricardian trade model in which consumers rank goods
according to priority. The poorest country, country 1, has a comparative advantage in
the production of lower ranked goods, and, hence specializes in goods with lower income
elasticities in demand. The richest country, country 3, has a comparative advantage in
the production of the highest-ranked goods, and hence, specializes in goods with higher
income elasticities in demand. The medium rich country, country 2, has a comparative
advantage in the production of the intermediate-ranked commodities. Goods at the lower
end of the spectrum are consumed by all households and when income increases households
add higher-ranked goods to their consumption basket.
Within this framework the following insights emerge. First, a PTA does not necessarily
deteriorate the terms of trade of the country that is left outside of the agreement, though
this very much depends on the income level of the non-member. We show that being a
nonmember implies for the poor country that its terms of trade typically deteriorate, while
for a rich country the terms of trade may still improve. Second, being left outside a PTA
agreement is typically bad for welfare, except for the rich country. This is due to the
presence of asymmetric demand complementarities. Whereas the outside country su¤ers
as the PTA membersexpenditure switching goes at their expense, for a rich country this
might be compensated by the way the PTA members spend their real income gains. As
these are typically spent on country 3 goods only, it explains why the chances on a welfare
improvement for a nonmember are higher the richer is the country. Third, being a member
of a PTA is no guarantee for welfare improvements. Only countries that are too poor to
import the whole range of world products can be assured that opening up their borders
preferentially leads to welfare gains. For the other countries it depends to a large extent
on how comparative advantages di¤er across the world.
The general conclusion is that the income level of a country greatly matters for assessing
the welfare e¤ects of PTAs. Being a low income country leads to di¤erent inferences
regarding the costs and benet of preferential trading agreements than being a medium or
high income country. Moreover, it is not only the income di¤erences per se that matter for
the welfare results of PTAs, but also the extent of these income di¤erences. For instance,
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if the poor countrys income level is so low that it is partly insulated from world trade,
our analysis shows that it will gain by joining a preferential trade agreement with a richer
counterpart. If instead the poor countrys income level is such that it also imports the
higher-ranked goods, we show that it loses from PTA formation.
Of course, there are several ways to extend our current analysis. One issue is that we
have considered small changes in tari¤s, thus ruling out the possibility of switching from an
asymmetric trade equilibrium to a symmetric trade equilibrium (or vice versa). Intuitively,
we would expect that such regime switches will not qualitatively a¤ect our results, but
quantitatively they might of course. By performing simulations we hope to shed some
light on this matter. Simulations are also useful to compare the welfare outcomes of the
di¤erent trade regimes we have considered (PTA, multilateral, unilateral). Comparing the
PTA results with the multilateral results, we see that a truly poor country will prefer a PTA
with a rich country over multilaterally liberalizing its trade, but that for the rich country
the extensive poorness of its counterpart is a reason not to engage in such a PTA. Rather
it rather would form a PTA with poor countries that are rich enough to import their goods
prior to PTA formation. But then the poor country would face a welfare loss. Simulations
might help to unravel the specic circumstances under which either of the integration
regimes is to be preferred. By the same token, simulations will be helpful for assessing the
quantatative di¤erences between the two equilibrium congurations of our analysis. Finally,
we note that by assuming homogenous population in each country, we have focussed on
the world income distribution and have ignored the potential consequences of the income
distribution within countries. This issue is part of our current research agenda.
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9. Appendix
9.1. Labor market equilibria
9.1.1. Labor market condition for country 1
Here we derive equation (2.11) given in the main text. Using (2.10), we note
L1 = N1
R1
0
h1dF1(h1)
=
R z3
0
a1(z)Q1(z)dz +
R z2
0
a1(z)Q3(z)dz +
R z1
0
a1(z)Q2(z)dz:
(9.1)
For clarity, let us expand the expenditure expressions, given in equation (2.7), as follows
E1(z) =
R z
0
w1a1(s)ds for z  z3
E2(z) =  21
R z
0
w1a1(s)ds for z  z1
E3(z) =  31
R z
0
w1a1(s)ds for z  z2
(9.2)
and
E1(z) = E1(z3) +  12
R z
0
w2a2(s)ds for z3 < z  z5
E2(z) = E2(z1) +
R z
0
w2a2(s)ds for z1 < z  z6
E3(z) = E3(z2) +  32
R z
0
w2a2(s)ds for z2 < z  z4
(9.3)
Applying Leibnizs rule for di¤erentiation of denite integrals, we derive the following useful
relations from (9.2) and (9.3):
dE1(z) = w1a1(z)dz for z  z3
dE2(z) =  21w1a1(z)dz for z  z1
dE3(z) =  31w1a1(z)dz for z  z2
dE1(z) =  12w2a2(z)dz for z3 < z  z5
dE2(z) = w2a2(z)dz for z1 < z  z6
dE3(z) =  32w2a2(z)dz for z2 < z  z4
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Substituting these relationships into (9.1) we obtain
w1L1 =
Z z3
0
Q1(z)dE1(z) +
Z z1
0
1
 21
Q2(z)dE2(z) +
Z z2
0
1
 31
Q3(z)dE3(z)
=
Z z3
0
N1
"Z 1
E1(z) TR1
w1
dF1(h1)
#
dE1(z) +
Z z1
0
N2
21
"Z 1
E2(z) TR2
w2
dF2(h2)
#
dE2(z)
+
Z z2
0
N3
31
"Z 1
E3(z) TR3
w3
dF3(h3)
#
dE3(z)
= N1
Z 1
0
"Z minfE 11 (w1h1+TR1); z3g
0
dE1(z)
#
dF1(h1)
+N2
21
Z 1
0
"Z minfE 12 (w2h2+TR2); z1g
0
dE2(z)
#
dF2(h2)
+N3
31
Z 1
0
"Z minfE 13 (w3h3+TR3); z2g
0
dE3(z)
#
dF3(h3)
w1L1 = N1
Z 1
0
min fw1h1 + TR1; E1(z1)g dF1(h1)
+N2
21
Z 1
0
min fw2h2 + TR2; E2(z1)g dF2(h2)
+N3
31
Z 1
0
min fw3h3 + TR3; E3(z2)g dF3(h3);
where the second equality uses equation (2.9), the third equality applies a change in vari-
ables as in Lederman (1966) and the nal equality explicitly expresses the inner integrals.
In a similar way, the labor market conditions for country 2 and 3 can be derived.
9.1.2. Labor market conditions for countries 2 and 3
Similar to the derivation of the labor market condition for country 1, we obtain for country
2:
w2L2 =
N1
12
1R
0
min [w1h1 + TR1   E1(z3); E1(z5)  E1(z3)] dF1(h1)
+N2
1R
0
min [w2h2 + TR2   E2(z1); E2(z6)  E2(z1)] dF2(h2)
+N3
32
1R
0
min [w3h3 + TR3   E3(z2); E3(z4)  E3(z2)] dF3(h3);
(9.4)
where E1(z5) E1(z3) =  12
R z5
z3
w2a2(s)ds; E2(z6) E2(z1) =
R z6
z1
w2a2(s)ds; and E3(z4) 
E3(z2) =  32
R z4
z2
w2a2(s)ds:
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For country 3, we obtain
w3L3 =
N1
13
1R
0
max [w1h1 + TR1   E1(z5); 0] dF1(h1)
+N2
23
1R
0
max [w2h2 + TR2   E2(z6); 0] dF2(h2)
+N3
1R
0
max [w3h3 + T3   E3(z4); 0] dF3(h3):
(9.5)
9.2. Balanced Trade Conditions
This appendix sketches the derivation of (3.1) from (2.12). All other trade balance con-
ditions can be derived in an analogues way. We start from the assumption that, in the
symmetric equilibrium, all consumers spend their last unit of income on goods produced
in country 3. Making use of assumption 4 the following inequalities apply:
w2 + TR2 > E2(z1);
w3 + TR3 > E3(z2);
w1 + TR1   E1(z3) > E1(z5)  E1(z3);
w1 + TR1   E1(z5) > 0:
Hence the trade balance condition becomes:
N2
 21
E2(z1) +
N3
 31
E3(z2) = N1
Z z5
z3
w2a2(s)ds+
N1
 13
[w1h1 + TR1   E1(z5)] ;
and after making use of country 1s budget constraint yields (3.1) as given in the main text.
9.3. E¤ects of unilateral tari¤ reductions
9.3.1. Symmetric spending equilibrium
The symmetric equilibrium is contained in the six equations for e¢ cient production (2.1)-
(2.6), the balanced trade conditions (3.1), (3.2), and the budget conditions (3.3)-(3.5).
Rewriting conditions(2.1)-(2.6) in percentage form yields
bz1 =   12 [b!2 + b 21] ; bz4 = 1 [b!2   b!3   b 32] ;bz2 =   12 [b 31 + b!2   b 32] ; bz5 = 1 [b!2   b!3 + b 13   b 12] ;bz3 =   12 [b!2   b 12] ; bz6 = 1 [b!2   b!3 + b 23] :
(9.6)
where 2 > 0;   3  2 > 0; and where we have applied our assumption that 2(zi) = 2
and 3(zi) = 3;8i.
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Total di¤erentiation of (3.1) and (3.2), making use of (2.1)-(2.6) and (3.3)-(3.5) and
evaluated at  ik =  ij for i; j; k = 1; 2; 3 and i 6= j; k yields
" b!2b!3
#
=
1
D
"

22 0

21 
11
#
26666666664
t11  t21
 t12 t22
 t13 t23
 t14 t24
 t15 t25
t16  t26
37777777775
T 26666666664
b 12b 13b 21b 23b 31b 32
37777777775
; (9.7)
where the superscript T represents the transpose of a vector. The determinant D =

11
22 > 0 since

11 = N1a1(z3)z3 +N2a1(z1)z1 +N3a1(z2)z2 > 0;

21 = 
22 + [N1a2(z3)z3 +N2a2(z1)z1 +N3a2(z2)z2] > 0;

22 = 2 [N1a2(z5)z5 +N2a2(z6)z6 +N3a2(z4)z4] > 0:
With
t11 = N1a1(z3)z3;
t13 = N2a1(z1)z1;
t15 = N3a1(z2)z2;
t12 = 0;
t14 = 0;
t16 = N3a1(z2)z2;
t21 = N1 [2a2(z5)z5 + a2(z3)z3] ;
t23 = N2a2(z1)z1;
t25 = N3a2(z2)z2;
t22 = 2N1a2(z5)z5;
t24 = 2N2a2(z6)z6;
t26 = N3 [2a2(z4)z4 + a2(z2)z2] :
It is helpful to recognize that

22   
21 =   [N1a2(z3)z3 +N2a2(z1)z1 +N3a2(z2)z2] < 0;
=  !2 [N1a1(z3)z3= 12 +N2a1(z1)z1 21 +N3a1(z2)z2] < 0;

21   
11!2 = 
22 + !2[N1a1(z3)z3( 112   1) +N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1)];
= 
22 + [N1a2(z3)z3(1   12) +N2a1(z1)z1!2( 21   1)];

21   
11!2= 12 = 
22 + !2
h
N2a1(z1)z1( 21   112 ) +N3a1(z2)z2(1  112 )
i
> 0;

21   
11!2 21 = 
22   !2[N1a1(z3)z3( 21   112 ) +N3a1(z2)z2( 21   1)];
where we make use of (2.1)-(2.6) and the assumption that  ik =  ij for i; j; k = 1; 2; 3 and
i 6= j; k: Now, substituting the elements tij into (9.7) and (9.6) makes it possible to derive
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the results shown in Table 1 of the text. The comparable results obtained by ACF are
given in the same table by the panel on the right. These results coincide with those as
given in Table 1, p. 154 of ACF.
9.3.2. Asymmetric spending equilibrium
The asymmetric equilibrium is contained in the six equations for e¢ cient production (2.1)-
(2.6), the balanced trade conditions (3.6) and (3.7), and the budget conditions (3.8), (3.4),
and (3.5). The percentage change in relative wages can then be deduced from the following
system:
" b!2b!3
#
=
1eD
" e
22 0e
21 e
11
#
26666664
s11  s21
 s13 s23
s14 s24
 s15 s25
s16  s26
37777775
T 26666664
b 12b 21b 23b 31b 32
37777775 ; (9.8)
with eD = e
22e
11 > 0 ande
11 = N1a1(z3)z3 +N2a1(z1)z1 +N3a1(z2)z2 > 0;e
22 = 2 [N2a2(z6)z6 +N3a2(z4)z4] > 0;e
21 = !2N1 2(1  R z30 a1(s)ds) + a1(z3)z3
+N2 [a2(z1)z1 + 2a2(z6)z6] +N3 [a2(z2)z2 + 2a2(z4)z4] > 0:
With
s11 = N1a1(z3)z3
s13 = N2a1(z1)z1;
s15 = N3a1(z2)z2;
s12 = 0;
s14 = 0;
s16 = N3a1(z2)z2 > 0;
s21 = N1!2a1(z3)z3;
s23 = N2a2(z1)z1;
s25 = N3a2(z2)z2;
s22 = 0;
s24 = 2N2a2(z6)z6;
s26 = N3 [2a2(z4)z4 + a2(z2)z2] :
It is helpful to recognize thate
21 = e
22 + !2N1 2(1  R z30 a1(s)ds) + a1(z3)z3
+[N2a2(z1)z1 +N3a2(z2)z2] > 0;e
21   !2e
11 = e
22 + !2 2N1(1  R z30 a1(s)ds) +N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1) > 0;e
21    21!2e
11 = e
22 + !2 2N1(1  R z30 a1(s)ds)  (N1a1(z3)z3 +N3a1(z2)z2)( 21   1) :
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Substituting the elements sij into (9.8) makes it possible to derive the results shown in
Table 1b. This also determines the signs of [!2=!3. The signs for bzi, i = 1::6, follow by
applying (9.6).This leads to the comparative statics results for unilateral tari¤ reductions
as given in Table 1b in the main text (left panel).
9.4. Welfare expressions
In this part of the appendix we derive the welfare expressions used to derive the results
illustrated in Tables 2, 6, and 7b (8b). The welfare e¤ects follow from total di¤erentiation of
equations (3.3)-(3.5) for the symmetric equilibrium and equations (3.4)-(3.5) plus (3.8) for
the asymmetric equilibrium and making use of the assumption that each country imposes
the same tari¤ rate on its imports regardless of the country of origin, i.e.,  jk =  jk0 for
j; k; k0 = 1; 2; 3. We conne ourselves to discussing the welfare e¤ects for the symmetric
spending equilibrium and for country 1. Those for the other countries and the asymmetric
spending equilibrium follow by applying analogous methodology. These, as well as more
detailed calculations can be obtained from the authors upon request. For country 1, we
calculate
a3(u1)du1 = a3(z5)z5bz5   !3a1(z3)z3bz3   !3
!2
[a2(z5)z5bz5   a2(z3)z3bz3]
+
!3
!2
Z z5
z3
a2(s)dsb!2 + Z u1
z5
a3(s)dsb!3:
When we use (2.1)-(2.6), the expression can be rewritten to
a3(u1)du1 =

1   13
 12

a3(z5)z5bz5 + (1   12) !3
!2
a2(z3)z3bz3
+
!3
!2
Z z5
z3
a2(s)dsb!2 + Z u1
z5
a3(s)dsb!3
so that when  12 =  13 it reduces to the expression as given in the main text.
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10. Tables and Figures
Table 1a: E¤ects of unilateral tari¤ changes, symmetric case
Our analysis A rise in :
 12  13  21  23  31  32
z1   0   0 +  
z2   0 + 0   +
z3 + 0 + 0 +  
z4  1=+2        4 +3= 2
z5   +      4 +3=+2
z6  1=+2     +  4 +3=+2
!2 + 0   0   +
!3 +
1=?2 + +1= 2 + +3= 2  3=?
!2=!3  1=+2        4 +3=+2
1if 2 ! 0; 2if  ! 0;
3if 2 ! 0 and N1a1(z3)z3(1  112 ) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1);
4if N1a1(z3)z3(1  112 ) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1);
ACF A rise in:
 12  13  21  23  31  32
z1   +   + +  
z2   + + +   +
z3 + + + + +  
z4 +          
z5   +       +
z6 +     +   +
!2 +         +
!3  +   +   
!2=!3 +         +
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Table 1b: E¤ects of unilateral tari¤ changes, asymmetric case
Our analysis A rise in:
 12  21  23  31  32
z1     0 +  
z2   + 0   +
z3 + + 0 +  
z4    1   +  
z6    1 + +  1=+2
!2 +   0   +
!3 + +
1= 2 +   +1=?2
!2=!3    1=?2   +  1=+2
1if 2 ! 0; 2if  ! 0;
The results obtained by ACF are taken from Table 1, p. 154 of ACF (1989). The compar-
ison with ACF is not relevant for the asymmetric case, as in their framework spending is
symmetric by denition.
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10.1. Welfare e¤ects of unilateral tari¤ changes
Table 2a Welfare: Unilateral tari¤ reduction gives rise to
symmetric  12  13  21  23  31  32
u1  3   ?1=+2    4=+2 +4=?2
u2 ?
1=+2   ?1=?2 ?1=+2  6 +5=+2
u3 +
1= 2 + +1=?2 + +5=?2  5=+2
1if 2 ! 0;
2if  ! 0;
3if 2 ! 0 and   0;
4if 2 ! 0;   0 and N1a1(z3)z3(1  112 ) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1);
5if 2 ! 0 and N1a1(z3)z3(1  112 ) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1);
6if N1a1(z3)z3(1  112 ) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1);
Table 2b Welfare: Unilateral tari¤ reduction gives rise to
asymmetric  12  21  23  31  32
u1 +
1=?2 + 0 +  
u2  3=?2  3=?2 +2 +3=?2  3=+2
u3 +
1=+2 +1=?2 +  1= 2 +1=+2
1if 2 ! 0;
2if  ! 0;
3if 2 ! 0 and   0;
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10.2. General equilibrium e¤ects of PTAs
Table 3: General equilibrium results for PTA23:
A mutual decline in tari¤s gives rise to:
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 !2 !3 !2=!3
symmetric equilibrium: +   +  4=+2  4=+3  4= 2   +4= 3  4=+3
asymmetric equilibrium: +   + +1=+2 n.a. +1= 2    1= 3 +1=+3
1if 2 ! 0;2 if  ! 0;
3if  ! 0 and N2a2(z6)z6 > N3a2(z4)z4;
4if 2 ! 0 and N1a1(z3)z3(1  112 ) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1);
Table 4: General equilibrium results for PTA12:
A mutual decline in tari¤s gives rise to:
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 !2 !3 !2=!3
symmetric equilibrium: + +4   +1= 2 + +1= 2  4  1=?2 +1= 2
asymmetric equilibrium: + +4   +1=?2 n.a. +1=?2  4  1= 3 +1=?2
1if 2 ! 0; 2if  ! 0;
3if  ! 0 and N1a1(z3)z3 > N2a1(z1)z1;
4if N1a1(z3)z3 > N2a1(z1)z1;
Table 5: General equilibrium results for PTA13
A mutual decline in tari¤s gives rise to:
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 !2 !3 !2=!3
symmetric equilibrium:   +   +3=+2 +3= 2 +3=+2 +  3 +3=+2
asymmetric equilibrium:   +     n.a.   + +  
1if 2 ! 0; 2if  ! 0;
3if 2 ! 0 and N1a1(z3)z3(1  112 ) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1);
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10.3. Welfare e¤ects of PTAs
Table 6: Welfare eects of PTAs for uniform tari structures
u1 u2 u3
(2 ! 0= ! 0) (2 ! 0= ! 0) (2 ! 0= ! 0)
PTA12
Symmetric  1=?  1=+ += 
Asymmetric +=?  1=? +=+5
PTA13
Symmetric  3=?  4=  +4=+
Asymmetric +=+ +1=?  = 
PTA23
Symmetric  3= 2 +4=+  4=+
Asymmetric  =   1=+ +=+
1if 2 ! 0 and   0;
2if  ! 0 and N3a2(z4)z4 < N2a2(z6)z6;
3if 2 ! 0;   0; and N1a1(z3)z3(1  112 ) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1);
4if 2 ! 0 and N1a1(z3)z3(1  112 ) > N2a1(z1)z1( 21   1);
5if  ! 0 and N1a1(z3)z3 > N2a1(z1)z1;
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10.4. Multilateral tari¤ reductions
Table 7a: General equilibrium results for multilateral tari¤ reductions
A mutual decline in tari¤s gives rise to:
z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6 !2 !3 !2=!3
symmetric equilibrium: + +3   + +1=+4 +1= 2  3  1=?2 +1=+4
asymmetric equilibrium: + +3   +1=+2 n.a. +1= 2  3  1=?2 +1=+4
1if 2 ! 0; 2if  ! 0;
3if N1a1(z3)z3 > N2a2(z1)z1;
4if  ! 0 and N2a2(z6)z6 > N3a2(z4)z4;
Table 7b: Welfare eects of multilateral tari reductions
A mutual decline in all tari¤ rates gives rise to:
 symmetric asymmetric
u1  3=?2 +1
u2  3=+2  3=+2
u3 +
1=+2 +1=+2
1if 2 ! 0; 2if  ! 0; 3if 2 ! 0 and   0;
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 Figure 1: Production and trade patterns 
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